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which nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction will continue to cast
a shadow over international relations,
even if no single superpower confronts
the United States as a possible enemy.

in pushing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty; such a joint interest was not
nearly so important as the issues that divided Washington and Moscow—and
they were dire.

Gray certainly claims to be in step with
rapidly changing events, while cautioning us against the missteps of others.
Even while he asserts that the role of nuclear weapons will be substantially different in light of all that has happened in
the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
Gray, by stressing a second nuclear age,
emphasizes that such weapons will still
be very important.

In short, Colin Gray’s book may be
right on many of the points it raises,
but it is misleading to advertise it as
heralding something so new as a “second” nuclear age.

However, one suspects that most of the
advice offered here, now that the Cold
War is over, is not really so different from
the advice the author was offering during
the Cold War, advice that did not have
much influence on policy. Gray states
that anti-missile defense is necessary, not
merely desirable. Yet was not his message
earlier that such defenses were desirable,
almost to the point of being necessary?
Gray says that deterrence is not always
reliable—the same message he often advanced with regard to the Soviet Union.
He notes that the American advantage in
conventional weapons, in conjunction
with the enthusiasm over a “revolution in
military affairs,” may be transitory and illusory; however, during the Cold War he believed that the advantage in conventional
warfare rested with Moscow.
Gray scoffs at the analyses that emphasize preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, suggesting instead that such proliferation may be
inevitable—a condition rather than a
problem. But in the old days of the
Cold War, Gray was ready to argue
that one should not make too much
of the Soviet-American cooperation
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As always, Gray displays a broad awareness of the contemporary literature, set
against a deep familiarity with history.
But notwithstanding Gray’s critical analysis of the foibles of those who prematurely think that any “nuclear age” has
come to an end, his own prose at times
comes across as wordy and convoluted,
and his message has not changed.
In sum, the book might amount to what
could have been said as well in one of the
author’s journal articles.
GEORGE H. QUESTER

University of Maryland

Bracken, Paul. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian
Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age. New
York: HarperCollins, 1999. 186pp. $25

The incorporation of Asia into the Western-dominated international system is
critical for the United States. At present,
the United States is reacting to events in
Asia instead of shaping them. This is the
fundamental message of Fire in the East,
an important book by Paul Bracken of
Yale University.
Asia, extending from Israel to North Korea, has become increasingly visible since
the end of the (primarily Eurocentric)
Cold War. Discussions of Asian strength,
however, have been flawed. Japan has
struggled economically for ten years, and
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it still lacks political and military power.
The intent of Chinese modernization and
its impact on the world community remain subjects of controversy. The 1998
“Asian Flu” wracked the economies of
the infamous “Little Tigers,” thereby diminishing their statures.
Because globalization and nationalism
provide the means and desire to develop
nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, rising Asian power is increasingly important. As Bracken contends,
globalization is about economics, not
politics, yet it increases national military
potential by providing multiple, inexpensive sources of weapons and military
technologies. Consequently, proliferation in a globalized economy is a
long-term process linked to rising global
scientific and technological prowess. Add
to this existing national security motivations for the development of these capabilities, and it is evident how and why
Asian military power will grow.
These trends are particularly important
because they constitute a second nuclear
age. Recent evidence abounds; for instance, in the wake of the Gulf War it was
discovered just how close Iraq had been
to completing a deliverable nuclear
weapon. Iranian missile and nuclear ambitions are clear, punctuated by a medium-range ballistic missile test in 1998.
The governments of Pakistan and India
conducted flight tests of similar missiles
in April 1998 and May 1999, respectively,
and each country detonated nuclear
weapons in May 1998. China is actively
modernizing both its nuclear capabilities
and ballistic missiles, manifested by an
August 1999 flight test of a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Much has
been written about the nuclear potential
of North Korea, which continues to
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develop and test ballistic missiles, most
notably in August 1998.
Bracken maintains that these trends
portend the decline of Western military
dominance, in part because Asia and the
West are moving in different directions.
For example, nationalism, considered by
the United States to be an anachronism,
remains a powerful force in Asia. In another case of strategic divergence, Bracken
highlights different approaches to warfare.
The U.S. prefers long-range, stealthy, and
precise conventional attacks that allow
conflict that is quick and bloodless (with
respect to Americans), with less collateral
harm to noncombatants and civilian resources. In the East, indiscriminate weapons and ballistic missiles encourage more
destructive and decisive options.
American policy may encourage the
growth of Asian political-military power.
By preferring an antiseptic form of future
war and by not preparing for casualties,
the United States leaves itself vulnerable
to, and provides incentive for, a nation
that has a greater will to visit destruction
upon its adversaries. This has the further
result of straining the foundations of
deterrence. In the first nuclear age,
the United States sought to deter one
opponent, the Western-oriented and
largely risk-averse Soviet Union. Now,
the United States must deter multiple
powers whose values, belief systems, and
strategic-cultural orientations differ
greatly from those of the United States.
This is not merely an academic point.
Although deterrence during the Cold
War was dangerous, the Cold War never
turned hot. The perils of the second nuclear age, however, have already been
evinced: the Iraqi obstinacy in 1990 that
led to war; the crisis-filled nuclear negotiations with North Korea between 1992
and 1994; the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis
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with China; and the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. These events illustrate a dynamic that pits increased Asian
assertiveness against U.S. desire for the
status quo.
Bracken argues these points persuasively.
Historically, these kinds of systemic
transformations have been the most
dangerous. In the fifth century B.C.,
Thucydides asserted that the Peloponnesian
War had begun due to Spartan fear of
rising Athenian power. Thus, a greater
discussion of how to integrate such diverse, assertive, and armed Asian nations
would have been interesting.
It could be objected that Bracken incorrectly treats many dissimilar nations, governments, and cultures as if they were the
same. Simply stated, it makes a difference
what kind of government is in power. In
addition, other variables are not accounted for, such as the disintegration of
the Iranian theocracy (less than twenty-five
years ago Iran was our staunchest ally in
the Middle East). In North Korea, whether
a “soft landing” or a more violent collapse
occurs could fundamentally influence regional transformation. Last, the effect of
potentially severe ethnic problems in China
is not addressed.
Despite these shortcomings, Bracken deals
convincingly with important topics.
Footnotes are not to be found, and his
bibliography is limited given the breadth
of the subject, but he has integrated information from a variety of fields. Defense
and foreign policy students and practitioners
alike should read Fire in the East.
PHILIP L. RITCHESON

Falls Church, Virginia

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001

BOOK REVIEWS

163

Lilley, James R., and David Shambaugh, eds. China’s
Military Faces the Future. New York: M. E. Sharpe,
1999. 356pp. $29.95

This collection of high-quality essays by
some of the leading experts on the Chinese
military is the product of the 1997 Seventh
Annual Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sponsored by the
American Enterprise Institute. The authors, although inspired by different security and threat perceptions, present sober,
straightforward, and reasonable assessments of PLA efforts to modernise itself in
the 1990s and of its prospects for the immediate future. Evidence drawn from the
essays shows that the PLA is increasingly
modern, confident, and assertive but that
it has not yet developed sophisticated theories and technologies comparable to
those of the United States or relevant to
fighting an American-style, high-tech limited war, or any war beyond its borders.
The provocative variations on this theme,
shaped by starkly different—seemingly
contradictory, yet ultimately reinforcing—dynamics of Chinese and East Asian
politics, are instrumental in defining the
evolution and nature of the PLA.
This perceptive, informative, and well
written book is divided into four sections:
on the “New High Command,” “Doctrine,
Strategy, and Weapons,” the “Support
Base,” and “China’s Northeast Asian Security Environment.” Each section has its
strengths. After a careful but critical examination of biographical materials on
new military leaders, the first provides
unusual insight into the PLA’s inner circle
of decision making by identifying two
fundamental changes in civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. First, none
of the top party leaders has any military
background or connections, whereas none
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